The New Dual State: Judicial Autonomy and Political Control in China

The New Dual State examines how regimes can institutionalize judicial autonomy without relinquishing ultimate political control. Revising the dual state theory beyond its classical and contemporary formulations, the book proposes the theory of symbiotic dualism, which argues that the consolidation of political authority can clarify and stabilize the boundary between legal order and extralegal authority, thereby permitting limited judicial independence. Using China as the central case, the book shows how political centralization enabled the regime to insulate judges from local officials, suppress unsanctioned extrajudicial interventions, and channel politically sensitive disputes away from the courts. These measures have produced a system in which courts demonstrate increasing professionalism and autonomy in routine cases, while the regime retains decisive authority over politically salient matters. Grounded in extensive fieldwork and framed by comparative legal theory, the book advances a compelling framework for understanding legality outside the context of liberal democracies.